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I. INTRODUCTION
A trademark is a word, phrase, symbol, or design that is used to identify
or distinguish the source of one party’s goods from the goods of another.1 A
trademark owner can have common law rights, federal registration rights, or
both to a distinctive mark.2 Both common law trademarks and federally
registered trademarks afford an owner protectable, exclusive rights to the use
of that mark.3 Namely, the owner of the trademark may prevent others from
* Senior Note & Comment Editor, American University Business Law Review, Volume
9; J.D. Candidate, American University Washington College of Law; B.A., Political
Science, University of Florida, 2017. I would like to thank my parents, my sisters
Haaniya and Naeyma Ahmed, my grandparents, and my friends for their endless support.
I would also like to thank all of the AUBLR Volume 9 staff for their hard work.
1. See ANNE G. LALONDE & JEROME GILSON, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 3.02[1]
(2018).
2. Id.
3. See id. § 3.02[2]; see also Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d
1113, 1119–20 (5th Cir. 1991) (explaining that a trademark must serve as a “symbol of
origin” or as an indicator of source in order to be distinctive and protectable).

77

78

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 9:1

using its mark.4
While not required for ownership, federal registration creates additional
rights for trademark owners.5 Owning a mark protects the owner from
another user registering a confusingly similar mark or using the owners mark
without permission.6 Federal registration not only prevents infringement
before it happens, but also allows an owner to bring a claim to stop
infringement if it does occur.7 However, ownership can also be acquired
through common law, hence trademarks are widely regarded as creatures of
the common law, with rights independent of registration.8
The Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine is a common law trademark rule that
establishes the geographic reach of trademark rights.9 Based on two seminal
United States Supreme Court cases, Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf10
and United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Company,11 this doctrine
addresses two different types of users: first or senior users (“senior users”)
and second, subsequent, or junior users (“junior users”).12 It allows junior
users of a trademark to continue using the mark if they are operating in good
faith and are geographically remote from the senior user.13
The United States Supreme Court defined the primary function of a
trademark in Hanover Star Milling Co. as “identify[ing] the origin or
ownership of the article to which it is affixed;” so, if a junior user operates
in a remote area, it is unlikely that consumers will be confused between the
two users or will attribute ownership to the wrong user.14 Actual use of a

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

LALONDE & GILSON, supra note 1, § 3.02[2].
Id.
Id. § 3.02[3].
See id. § 3.02[2].
See id. § 3.02[1]; see also Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel
Corp., 305 U.S. 315, 334 (1938).
9. See generally Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 875 F.3d 426 (9th
Cir. 2017) (detailing how the Tea-Rose Rectanus doctrine came to be and explaining the
reasoning behind this common law rule).
10. 240 U.S. 403 (1916).
11. 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
12. See Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 436.
13. Id. at 436–37 (noting that the Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine is not automatically
defeated by a senior user filing for federal trademark registration, even though federal
registration presumably entitles a senior user to nationwide protection of that mark).
14. Hanover Milling Co., 240 U.S. at 412; see also United Drug Co., 248 U.S. at 100
(“The reason for the rule does not extend to [a mark] employed simultaneously . . . in
different markets separate and remote from each other, so that the mark means one thing
in one market, an entirely different thing in another.”); Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v.
Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that a junior user’s
consumers in sufficiently different locations are unlikely to know of the senior user).
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specific mark in commerce is generally the only requirement to establish
protectable common law trademark rights; therefore, the Tea Rose-Rectanus
doctrine allows two different non-competitive users in two geographically
diverse regions to establish rights to the same mark as long as the junior user
is operating in good faith.15
Circuits have come to different conclusions regarding the determination
of “good faith” in accordance with this doctrine.16 The main issue is whether
mere knowledge of another’s use of a specific mark is enough to destroy
good faith or if that knowledge is only part of a larger good faith test that
must be accompanied by an intent to benefit from the reputation of the senior
user.17 The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits hold that any knowledge of
a senior user’s mark must destroy good faith.18 The Fifth and Tenth Circuits,
on the other hand, hold that knowledge is only one factor that informs good
faith analysis.19 This Comment will analyze the split of the Seventh, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits versus the Fifth and Tenth Circuits on good faith analysis
in the Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine. This Comment will first focus on the
creation of the Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine and its application in various
circuits, then analyze different approaches to this circuit split, and offer
recommendations as to how knowledge factors into the good faith
determinations.
15. See Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. at 412; LALONDE & GILSON, supra note
1, § 3.02[1].
16. Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 437 (describing the longstanding circuit split on
good faith determination in the Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine).
17. Id.; see Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V., 391 F.3d at 1104 (“Seeking to attract
customers does not constitute bad faith . . . .”).
18. See, e.g., Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 438 (holding that a junior user’s
knowledge of prior use defeats any claim of good faith as a defense to trademark
infringement); Nat’l Ass’n for Healthcare Commc’ns, Inc. v. Cent. Ark. Area Agency on
Aging Inc., 257 F.3d 732, 735 (8th Cir. 2001) (applying the same approach as the 9th
and 7th Circuits, stating that the junior user “adopted the [mark] in good faith, without
knowledge of [the] prior use”); Money Store v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 674–
75 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that a junior user demonstrates good faith when it uses a
trademark with no knowledge that anyone else is already using the same trademark, and
therefore knowledge must be enough to preclude good faith).
19. See, e.g., C.P. Interests, Inc. v. Cal. Pools, Inc., 238 F.3d 690, 700 (5th Cir. 2001)
(citing El Chico, Inc. v. El Chico Cafe, 214 F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 1954)) (stating that
5th Circuit precedent does not conform with the majority view, holding that knowledge
of use also requires an “intent to benefit from the reputation or good will of the [senior
user]” and that knowledge is not always inconsistent with good faith); GTE Corp. v.
Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 541 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg
Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1485 (8th Cir. 1987)) (internal citations omitted) (“While a
subsequent user’s adoption of a mark with knowledge of another’s use can certainly
support an inference of bad faith, mere knowledge should not foreclose further inquiry.
The ultimate focus is on whether the second user had the intent to benefit from the
reputation or goodwill of the first user.”).
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II. TEA ROSE-RECTANUS DOCTRINE: CREATION AND APPLICATION
Both common law rights and federal registration rights make a mark
distinctive and protectable.20 These rights establish a senior user who has
rights to the mark and may exercise those rights over any subsequent junior
user.21 Registration is not necessary for ownership, but adds to common law
rights based on an intent to use the mark in interstate commerce.22 Actual
use identifying a good’s source distinguishes it from similar goods and is
generally the only basis for ownership under common law.23
The Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine, sometimes simply referred to as
“innocent local use,” is a rule controlling common law ownership and actual
use of the same trademark by different senior and junior users as long as they
are geographically diverse from each other.24 Generally, the first senior party
to use a specific trademark has rights to that mark over any subsequent,
junior user of that mark, or any trademark that is confusingly similar to that
mark.25 Courts have applied a multi-factor test to determine if the Tea RoseRectanus doctrine applies: a junior user has priority for the trademark if he
uses the mark in (1) good faith; (2) a distinct geographic territory that is
remote from the territory where the senior user is using the mark; and (3) a
territory where the junior user of the mark will not be easily confused with
the senior user of the mark.26
A senior user has priority of use in the specific geographic area in which
it operates, but that does not necessarily mean that it also has priority of use
in other areas.27 The Ninth Circuit best explained this scope:
20. See Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1119–20 (5th Cir.
1991).
21. See Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 436–37.
22. See LALONDE & GILSON, supra note 1, § 3.02[3].
23. Id. § 3.02[3][iv][D] (citing United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S.
90, 97 (1918)) (“The right to a particular mark grows out of its use, not its mere adoption;
its function is simply to designate the goods as the product of a particular trader and to
protect his good will against the sale of another’s product as his . . . [o]wnership of a
trademark in the United States is quite simply based on actual use of that mark in United
States commerce.”).
24. See Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 436 (“[C]ommon-law trademark rights extend
only to the territory where a mark is known and recognized, so a later [junior] user may
sometimes acquire rights in pockets geographically remote from the first [senior] user’s
territory.”).
25. LALONDE & GILSON, supra note 1, § 3.02[3][c][v].
26. Id.; see Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 436.
27. See Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir.
2004); see also Emergency One, Inc. v. Am. Fire Eagle Engine Co., 332 F.3d 264, 271
(4th Cir. 2003) (explaining that the “good-faith remote user defense” is an exception to
the common law rule that a senior user has superior rights to its mark over any other
user).
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Under this rule, already established common law rights are carved out of
the registrant’s scope of protection. In other words, the geographic scope
of the senior user’s rights in a registered trademark looks like Swiss
cheese: it stretches throughout the United States with holes cut out where
others acquired common-law rights prior to the registration.28

This Swiss cheese analogy is easy to visualize when discussing how a user
could develop a trademark that is either identical to, or confusingly similar
to, another trademark already in use in a completely remote location.29 If
the geographic location of the junior user is sufficiently distinct and remote
from the location of the senior user, it is possible the junior user has no
knowledge of the senior user.30 Circuits differ as to how much weight this
knowledge has and whether it should preclude good faith.31
Much of the Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine is codified in the Lanham Act,
the federal statute governing trademarks and service marks.32 It defines a
trademark as a word, logo, or other device that identifies the source of a
product and distinguishes it from competitors.33 If a trademark is considered
valid and protectable, infringement occurs when another’s use can cause
confusion or mistake, or deceive consumers.34
The Lanham Act only discusses federal trademark registration but is still
used to protect unregistered marks.35 In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,
Inc.,36 the United States Supreme Court stated that the same principles
28. Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 436 (citations omitted).
29. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 314 (1988) (Brennan, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 436
(citing 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 26:31 (4th ed. 2017)).
30. See K Mart Corp., 486 U.S. at 314–15 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 436 (“Under this rule, alreadyestablished common-law rights are carved out of the registrant’s scope of protection.”).
But see Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 433–34 (explaining that two parties operating in
different geographical areas may still sell goods in converging market channels,
evidenced by Stone Creek using its website to participate in a market outside of its
specific geographic area).
31. Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 437 (describing the longstanding circuit split on
good faith determination).
32. See generally Lanham Act (Trademark Act of 1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2018)
(codifying an owner’s trademark rights).
33. Id. § 1127.
34. See id. § 1125(a).
35. See LALONDE & GILSON, supra note 1, § 3.02[1][ii]; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(prohibiting use in commerce of “any word, term, name, symbol, or device . . . [that] is
likely to cause confusion . . . as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
goods, services, or commercial activities by another person.”).
36. 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
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qualifying a mark for registration apply when deciding whether an
unregistered mark is protected by common law.37
Specific sections of the Lanham Act make it clear that a junior user’s
knowledge of a senior user is the most important part of a good faith
determination.38 For instance, Section 1115 requires a junior user’s mark to
be “adopted without knowledge of the registrant’s prior use,” meaning that
the Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine applies based on knowledge.39
Similarly, Section 1057 states that federal registration of a mark is
evidence of ownership and grants the right to use that mark in commerce.40
Later users are assumed to have knowledge of a mark that has been federally
registered because a listing on the federal register serves as constructive
notice to any junior user of a mark.41 Being listed on the federal register is
constructive notice that confers “a right of priority, nationwide in
effect . . . against any other [user].”42
a. Creating the Tea Rose-Rectanus Doctrine
One of the seminal United States Supreme Court cases that established the
Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine is Hanover Star Milling Co., which is widely
known as the Tea Rose case.43 Hanover Star Milling Company (“Hanover
Star”), an Illinois flour manufacturer, brought this action to stop another
37. Id. at 768 (“[I]t is common ground that § 43(a) [§ 1125 of the Lanham Act]
protects unregistered trademarks and that the general principles qualifying a mark for
registration . . . are for the most part applicable in determining whether an unregistered
mark is entitled to protection . . . .”). But see LALONDE & GILSON, supra note 1,
§ 3.02[2][a][i] (stating that the definition of trademarks from § 1127 does not strictly
apply to every case, since the Lanham Act does not specifically refer to unregistered
marks as such).
38. See Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 875 F.3d 426, 439 (9th Cir.
2017).
39. Id. (citing Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5)).
40. Id. (citing Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b)) (“A certificate of registration of a
mark . . . shall be prima facie evidence of the validity . . . of the registration of the mark,
of the owner’s ownership of the mark, and of the owner’s exclusive right to use the
registered mark.”).
41. Id. (citing Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1057(c), 1072) (“Registration of a mark on
the principal register . . . shall be constructive notice of the registrant’s claim of
ownership.”); see also Value House v. Phillips Mercantile Co., 523 F.2d 424, 429 (10th
Cir. 1975) (“[T]he constructive notice provision of § 1702 has eliminated the defense of
a subsequent user that he had adopted the mark in his area in good faith and with lack of
knowledge.”).
42. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c).
43. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 403, 406–08 (1916)
(explaining that the same parties had two separate cases in different circuits with the
same facts but with different outcomes, which prompted the United States Supreme
Court to hear the cases together and address both in one opinion).
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manufacturer from selling flour under the name “Tea Rose.”44 Hanover Star
had been selling under this name for over twenty-seven years and had
associated distinctive markings with the Tea Rose brand.45 This brand was
well known as the only flour advertised and sold under this name in
Alabama, Georgia, and Florida; therefore, the reputation of Hanover Star
was strongly tied to the reputation of Tea Rose flour.46
Another flour manufacturer based out of Ohio, the Allen & Wheeler
Company (“Allen & Wheeler”), had also adopted the words “Tea Rose” as
a trademark as early as 1872 and was using markings very similar to Hanover
Star’s markings.47 These were also used in Allen & Wheeler’s advertising,
but the company could not show which markets it regularly reached.48 Allen
& Wheeler could not prove the time, place, or circumstances that it used the
markings in advertisements in Alabama or any surrounding states but could
definitively prove that it did not actually sell any flour in these areas.49
Hanover Star, however, showed that it independently began using the
name “Tea Rose” for its flour in Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, and Florida
in 1885.50 Hanover Star adopted this mark in good faith and without
knowledge or notice that Allen & Wheeler was also using the mark, and the
parties could not show that there was any competition between their
products.51
In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that if the junior user uses
the same mark on similar goods, it implies that its goods are of the senior
user’s production.52 Consumers might be confused into buying from the
junior user while believing they are buying from the senior user, causing the
junior user to benefit from the senior user’s reputation and consumer base
44. Id. at 406–07.
45. Id. at 406 (stating that Hanover Star began using the mark in 1885 and describing

the distinctive markings as the words “Tea Rose” printed with three roses on various
sacks and barrels).
46. Id. (describing the different ways in which the distinct mark was used throughout
these states); see also id. at 410 (stating that Hanover Star was widely known in the area
as the “Tea Rose company” and its mill was widely known as the “Tea Rose mill”);
LALONDE & GILSON, supra note 1, § 3.02[2][c][iv] (explaining that a junior user’s
innocent remote use argument will lose credibility if a mark is well known and already
associated with the senior user).
47. Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. at 406–07.
48. Id. at 409 (explaining that Allen & Wheeler only sold 75 barrels in Cincinnati,
100 barrels in Pittsburgh, and 100 barrels in Boston in the 1870’s).
49. Id. at 409.
50. Id. at 410.
51. Id. (explaining that there was never proof of competition between the parties
because neither party advertised or sold its flour in the same territory).
52. Id. at 412.
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while also depriving the senior user of profits to which it was originally
entitled.53
This creates unfair competition based on trademark
infringement.54
The Court decided that if the two users are competing in the same market
and if there is a high risk of confusion, the prior application decides who is
the rightful user, but this does not apply if there is no overlap in competing
markets.55 In this case, the defendants were using the mark in a completely
different region and did not know of the plaintiffs’ prior use.56 Because of
this, the defendants could not unfairly benefit from the plaintiffs’ reputation
and must have been acting in good faith.57 This case created the first and
most debated prong of the Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine: the requirement that
a junior user’s trademark rights rely upon good faith usage.58
The other seminal United States Supreme Court case of the Tea RoseRectanus doctrine is United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co.59 This case
involves a Massachusetts woman, Ellen M. Regis, who began manufacturing
and selling a medicine called “Rex” in 1877, then registered a trademark for
it in 1898 and sold her product throughout New England.60 United Drug
Company (“United Drug”) then bought the trademark rights from Regis and
began manufacturing and selling the drugs in its chain of drug stores, “Rexall
remedies.”61 United Drug began selling this drug in its four stores in
Louisville, Kentucky, in 1911.62
In 1883, meanwhile, a Kentucky man represented by Theodore Rectanus
Company (“Rectanus”) began selling a different drug — also called “Rex”
53. Id. (clarifying that courts allow for redress in cases of trademark infringement
because parties have a valuable interest in the good will of their business and adopt
trademarks in order to maintain or extend that good will).
54. Id. at 413 (citing to Elgin Watch Co. v. Ill. Watch Co., 179 U.S. 665, 674 (1900))
(stating that business’s strong reliance on good will causes common law trademark cases
to be considered a part of the broader field of unfair competition law); see LALONDE &
GILSON, supra note 1, § 3.02[3][a][ii] (explaining that while the Lanham Act does not
give requirements for unregistered trademarks to be valid, they are still protected under
law).
55. Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. at 415 (citing Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn,
150 U.S. 460, 464 (1893)).
56. Id. at 409–11.
57. See id. at 410–11 (considering that the defendant and the plaintiff were selling in
different regions).
58. See LALONDE & GILSON, supra note 1, § 3.02 [3][c][v].
59. 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
60. Id. at 94 (describing that the name “Rex” was used on boxes, packaging, and
advertising in regular use of a common law mark).
61. Id.
62. Id.
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— throughout the Louisville area.63 Before United Drug’s 1912 expansion,
neither company knew of the other’s use of the mark.64
When United Drug sued Rectanus for trademark infringement and unfair
competition, the United States Supreme Court held that a trademark owner
cannot have territorial rights for a mark where the owner does not do
business.65 If the mark is being used in good faith in a completely different
geographic area, the senior user does not automatically have ownership
rights in that area if it does not conduct business there.66 Even though United
Drug owned the mark first, Rectanus developed and began using the mark in
good faith, with no knowledge of the other user.67 United Drug primarily
used the mark in New England and later expanded into Kentucky, while
Rectanus used the mark independently in Kentucky for some time.68
Therefore, Rectanus was allowed to keep using the mark in good faith.69
This case established the second and third prongs of the Tea Rose-Rectanus
doctrine, which differentiate a junior user’s distinct and remote geographic
territory from the territory where the senior user is using the mark.70
b. Circuits A: Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits
The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, on one side of the Tea RoseRectanus doctrine’s circuit split, all hold that simple knowledge of another’s
use of a trademark is enough to preclude good faith.71 These circuits believe
that a junior user with knowledge of a senior user’s mark could not

63. Id. (explaining briefly that the two medicines in question had different purposes:
United Drug’s Rex treated dyspepsia, while Rectanus’s Rex was considered a blood
purifier).
64. See id. at 94–95 (explaining that Rectanus spent a considerable amount building
its brand in Louisville and the surrounding areas, “so that — except for [United Drug’s]
prior adoption of the word in Massachusetts, of which he was entirely ignorant —
[Rectanus] was entitled to use the word as [its] trademark.”).
65. Id. at 95–96 (stating that this action was based on allegations of unfair
competition, justified only by trademark infringement); id. at 97–98 (“The owner of a
trademark may not, like the proprietor of a patented invention, make a negative and
merely prohibitive use of it as a monopoly.”) (citations omitted).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 98–100.
68. See id. at 98–99.
69. Id. at 100.
70. Id. at 101.
71. See, e.g., Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 875 F.3d 426, 438 (9th
Cir. 2017); Nat’l Ass’n for Healthcare Commc’ns, Inc. v. Cent. Ark. Area Agency on
Aging Inc., 257 F.3d 732, 735 (8th Cir. 2001); Money Store v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc., 689
F.2d 666, 674–75 (7th Cir. 1982).
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coincidentally choose the same mark.72 The junior user must be aware that
its actions negatively impact the senior user, since the junior user is
knowingly, if not intentionally, capitalizing on the senior user’s goodwill and
potentially blocking the senior user from expanding its business into a new
area.73 These circuits state that simple knowledge, without any additional
proof of intent, is enough to show that the junior user has acted in bad faith.74
A 2017 Ninth Circuit case, Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design,
Inc.,75 is the most recent case holding that knowledge is enough to preclude
good faith.76 Omnia Italian Design, Inc. (“Omnia”) was a leather furniture
manufacturer that admitted to infringing on a trademark owned by its exbusiness partner, Stone Creek, Inc. (“Stone Creek”).77 Stone Creek was also
a manufacturer that sold furniture through five showrooms in Phoenix,
Arizona.78 In 1990, Stone Creek created and started using its own logo,
which it trademarked in 1992, but did not federally register until 2012.79
Omnia and Stone Creek became business partners in 2003, working under
an agreement that Omnia would manufacture furniture branded with the
Stone Creek mark and Stone Creek would then sell that furniture.80 Omnia’s
unauthorized use was mainly on furniture manufactured for Bon-Ton Stores,
Inc. (“Bon-Ton”), which sold Omnia’s Stone Creek-labeled furniture to
consumers throughout the Midwest.81 Bon-Ton wanted to make Omnia its
only leather furniture supplier but asked Omnia to design a label that sounded
“more American.”82 When Bon-Ton chose the label “Stone Creek,” Omnia
recreated Stone Creek’s logo directly from its company materials and used
the mark on many different internal supplies.83 Omnia also designed
72. Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 439 (citing MCCARTHY, supra note 29, § 26.12).
73. Id. (“[A] user like Omnia knows that its actions come directly at the expense of

the senior user, potentially blocking the senior user from entering into the new market . . .
the junior user acted in bad faith, which ‘serves as evidence that the senior user’s mark,
at least in reputation, has extended to the new area.’”) (citing Developments in the Law
Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition, 68 HARV. L. REV. 814, 859 (1955) and
MCCARTHY, supra note 29, § 26.12).
74. See id.
75. 875 F.3d 426 (9th Cir. 2017).
76. Id. at 439.
77. Id. at 429.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 430 (stating that it waited twenty years to register its trademark and
describing the mark as “a red oval circling the words ‘Stone Creek’ for various types of
furniture”).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 430.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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warranty cards with the Stone Creek mark and used these items to sell
furniture in Bon-Ton’s galleries and online.84 During this time, Stone Creek
applied for, and received, a federal trademark registration.85
The Ninth Circuit held that because Omnia clearly knew that the mark
belonged to Stone Creek and continued to use it, Omnia was not acting in
good faith and could not invoke the Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine as a
defense.86 The Ninth Circuit argued that joining the Seventh and Eighth
Circuits in this split was the more appropriate holding, as it created a
knowledge standard that better conforms with the statutory language in the
Lanham Act.87 The Ninth Circuit also held that the Tea Rose-Rectanus
doctrine did not apply because Omnia was a “non-innocent remote user who
acquired no common law trademark rights.”88 Omnia even admitted that it
adopted Stone Creek’s trademark when it had indisputable knowledge of
Stone Creek’s use of the mark, confirming that Omnia was not operating in
good faith under the Seventh and Eighth Circuits’ rationale.89
c. Circuits B: Fifth and Tenth Circuits
The other perspective on this circuit split is that of the Fifth and Tenth
Circuits, which hold that knowledge is simply one element informing good
faith, rather than an element that automatically excludes good faith.90 These
circuits recognize that a junior user’s knowledge of another senior user’s
mark can undoubtedly support a finding of bad faith.91 However, the circuits
held that knowledge should not prevent further inquiry into whether the
junior user acted in bad faith with the intent to benefit from the reputation or
goodwill of the senior user.92
The more recent of these cases, C.P. Interests, Inc. v. California Pools,
84. Id. at 430–31.
85. Id. at 430.
86. Id. at 438 (citing K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 314 (1988))

(holding that knowledge of prior use defeats any claim of good faith).
87. Id. at 439.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., C.P. Interests, Inc. v. Cal. Pools, Inc., 238 F.3d 690, 700 (5th Cir. 2001)
(“[M]ere knowledge of defendant’s use of the mark does not defeat good faith, though it
is a factor you may consider . . . .”); GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 541 (10th
Cir. 1990).
91. GTE Corp., 904 F.2d at 541 (holding that knowledge of a mark and intent to
compete with that mark is not equivalent to the intent to mislead or confuse consumers);
see also El Chico, Inc. v. El Chico Cafe, 214 F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 1954) (noting that
knowingly using another’s mark does not necessarily equate to bad faith).
92. See GTE Corp., 904 F.2d at 541 (“[M]ere knowledge should not foreclose further
inquiry.”); El Chico, Inc., 214 F.2d at 726.
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Inc.,93 held in 2001 that mere knowledge of the senior user’s mark does not
defeat good faith but may be considered an important factor in determining
good faith.94 This case involved a senior user, California Pools, which was
established and began using the mark “California Pools” in 1952, and a
junior user, C.P. Interests, which began using the mark “California Pool
Repair & Service Company” in 1961.95 C.P. Interests was a Texas
corporation that primarily worked in pool service and repair, while
California Pools was a California corporation that primarily worked in pool
and spa construction.96 California Pools was interested in expanding to
Houston, Texas, in 1997, at which time it discovered that C.P. Interests had
been independently using the same name.97
California Pools informed C.P. Interests of its intent to expand into the
Houston market, requesting that C.P. Interests stop using the mark.98 The
court, however, held that C.P. Interests was a remote junior user of the mark
and had attained the right to use it.99 In contrast with the Seventh, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits, the Fifth Circuit justified this holding by stating that
knowledge is not the only important consideration.100 The Fifth Circuit
refused to join the majority view, arguing that good faith determination
should be done through a two-factor test, with knowledge of use and intent
to benefit going hand in hand.101
Similarly, GTE Corp. v. Williams102 is a 1990 Tenth Circuit case involving
a senior user, General Telephone Corporation (“GTE”), formed in 1935 and
a junior user, David Williams, who formed “General Telephone” in 1974.103
GTE received federal registration in 1982 and then brought this suit, but the
court found Williams was a good faith junior user.104 Williams was granted
93. 238 F.3d at 690.
94. Id. at 700 (explaining the concept of good faith and defining the doctrine as when

“a senior user has exclusive rights to a distinctive mark anywhere it was known prior to
the adoption of the junior user and has enforceable rights against any junior user who
adopted the mark with knowledge of its senior use.” (citing A.J. Canfield Co. v.
Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 295 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986)).
95. Id. at 692.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 692, 702.
100. Id. at 700.
101. Id. at 700–01 (citing El Chico, Inc. v. El Chico Cafe, 214 F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir.
1954)).
102. 904 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1990).
103. Id. at 537.
104. Id. at 537, 542.
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exclusive use in the Utah region where he operated.105
The Circuit also determined that Williams did not have enough knowledge
that GTE or any other entity used the name “General Telephone” as a
trademark, despite admitting to having once heard of a company called
“General Telephone and Electronics of California.”106 GTE argued that any
level of knowledge should, by itself, defeat a good faith claim, but the Tenth
Circuit held that even though a junior user’s adoption of a trademark with
knowledge strongly supports a finding of bad faith, knowledge still should
not take away from the ultimate focus of intent to benefit.107 In this case, the
Tenth Circuit determined that though Williams had briefly heard of GTE, he
never intended to benefit from GTE’s reputation or goodwill and was a good
faith junior user.108
III. ANALYZING THE DIFFERENT CIRCUITS’ APPROACHES TO THE SPLIT
The Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine allows a junior user to have priority for
a trademark over the senior user in a certain territory, as long as he uses that
mark in “good faith,” the territory is remote from the senior user, and
consumers would not easily confuse the two users.109 Good faith is the most
important and also most disputed prong of this test, since a user operating in
bad faith is dispositive to a Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine defense.110
The main issue on which the circuits disagree is whether simple
knowledge of a senior user’s earlier use of a trademark can preclude a junior
user’s good faith or if good faith must be determined through a two-factor
test: knowledge of a senior user’s mark accompanied by a junior user’s
intent to benefit from the reputation or goodwill of that user.111 Circuits A
105. Id. at 538–39 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 33(b)(5), 1115(b)(5) (2012)) (justifying that
Williams clearly lacked intent to confuse consumers or benefit from GTE’s reputation in
Wasatch Front, Utah).
106. Id. at 541–42.
107. Id. (citing Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1485 (10th
Cir. 1987)); see General Mills, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 824 F.2d 622, 627 (8th Cir. 1987);
Money Store v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 674–75 (7th Cir. 1982) (conceding
that knowledge can preclude good faith, but still holding that intent to benefit is more
important).
108. GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 541–42 (10th Cir. 1990).
109. LALONDE & GILSON, supra note 1, § 3.02[3][c][v] (articulating the Tea RoseRectanus doctrine’s multifactor test and emphasizing that the Lanham Act does not allow
senior users to obtain injunctions against good faith junior users who are operating in
good faith and in a geographically remote territory).
110. Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 875 F.3d 426, 436 (9th Cir. 2017)
(explaining that the reasoning of this case focuses mainly on good faith use, as a lack of
good faith should always be dispositive in any trademark infringement case).
111. See C.P. Interests, Inc. v. Cal. Pools, Inc., 238 F.3d 690, 700 (5th Cir. 2001)
(citing El Chico, Inc. v. El Chico Cafe, 214 F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 1954)); GTE Corp.,
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(the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits) hold that a junior user’s knowledge
of a senior user’s previous use of a trademark automatically precludes good
faith, therefore preventing the junior user from invoking the Tea RoseRectanus doctrine as a defense in an infringement case.112 Circuits B (the
Fifth and Tenth Circuits), on the other hand, have ruled that knowledge is
only one element of many that can be used to determine whether a junior
user is acting in good faith, rather than something that can automatically
exclude good faith.113 Both groups of circuits specifically state that very
similar or easily interchangeable trademarks can still be used by a junior user
who has knowledge of the senior user’s use without any real infringement
on the senior user’s mark if there is no actual confusion and no intent to
deceive consumers or benefit from the reputation and goodwill of another
user.114
a. Applying United States Supreme Court Precedent
In their various opinions, Circuits A regularly examined the Tea RoseRectanus doctrine’s origin cases to justify why knowledge alone is enough

904 F.2d at 541 (citing General Mills, Inc., 824 F.2d at 627). See generally Stone Creek,
Inc., 875 F.3d at 437 (providing a brief summary of the perspectives of each side of this
longstanding circuit split).
112. Nat’l Ass’n for Healthcare Commc’ns v. Cent. Ark. Area Agency on Aging, Inc.,
257 F.3d 732, 735 (8th Cir. 2001) (determining that junior users adopting a trademark in
good faith must have done so without knowledge of prior use); Money Store, 689 F.2d
at 674–75 (ruling that a junior user can only be operating in good faith if it uses a mark
with no prior knowledge that any other party is already using the same or a confusingly
similar mark); see, e.g., Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 439 (holding that any knowledge
of prior use must defeat a claim of good faith, as users cannot coincidentally use a
confusingly similar mark while knowing that someone is using the same).
113. GTE Corp., 904 F.2d at 541 (emphasizing the importance of focusing on the
intent to benefit from the good will or reputation of the senior user, rather than utilizing
knowledge of use as an automatic inference of bad faith when using the Tea RoseRectanus doctrine as a defense against trademark infringement); see, e.g., C.P. Interests,
Inc., 238 F.3d at 700 (refusing to agree with the view of the majority of circuits, instead
ruling that knowledge is not always inconsistent with good faith and must be
accompanied by an intent to benefit from confusion with the senior user, along with any
other relevant factors).
114. See GTE Corp., 904 F.2d at 541 (explaining that knowledge of prior use can
support an inference of bad faith) (citing Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828
F.2d 1482, 1485 (10th Cir. 1987) and Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d
920, 927 (10th Cir. 1986)); see also General Mills, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 824 F.2d 622,
627 (8th Cir. 1987) (explaining that knowledge and intent to compete with the product
of another user are not the same as an intent to “mislead and to cause consumer
confusion”); El Chico, Inc. v. El Chico Cade, 214 F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 1954)
(explaining the minimal importance of a junior user’s knowledge of another previous use
of the same mark, while emphasizing the significance of intent).
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to exclude a good faith claim.115 In Hanover Star Milling Co. (the “Tea
Rose” case), neither the junior nor the senior user had any knowledge of the
other using the same mark in another location, so the Court determined that
the users could not have any intent to benefit from the other.116 In accordance
with the reasoning in this case, any examination into intent would be
inconsequential in determining good faith.117
Similarly, in C.P. Interests, Inc., the Fifth Circuit argued that knowledge
is only one factor in the larger good faith inquiry.118 However, when
applying the reasoning from Hanover Star Milling Co. to the Fifth Circuit’s
holding, it is clear that knowledge is the only factor that should be of any
importance.119 In both cases, the junior and senior users were using the
confusingly similar trademarks in different markets and in completely
different geographic locations.120 Each junior user also did not have any
knowledge of each senior user’s previous use in either case, and the junior
user was allowed to continue using the mark in both.121 Because of these
similarities, the holding of C.P. Interests, Inc. seems to conform with the
holding of Hanover Star Milling Co., but the reasoning is completely
different.122 The Fifth Circuit justifies allowing a junior user’s knowledge
by stating that intent to benefit from another user’s reputation, rather than
any general knowledge of another’s use, must always be the most important
factor when making a good faith determination.123
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 437.
Id. (recounting the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Hanover Star).
Id. at 437–38.
C.P. Interests, Inc., 238 F.3d at 700.
Compare Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916)
(reasoning that because the junior user had no knowledge of the senior user, the junior
user did not commit trademark infringement), with C.P. Interests, Inc., 238 F.3d at 700–
01 (noting that both cases have similar facts as to knowledge and intent, with the senior
and junior users in each case independently establishing common law rights to
confusingly similar marks at different times and in different geographic territories).
120. See Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. at 409–10; C.P. Interests, Inc., 238 F.2d
at 700–01 (noting that both cases come to the same conclusion of allowing each
respective junior user to continue using the mark in good faith, but with two different
reasonings for doing so).
121. C.P. Interests, Inc., 238 F.3d at 700 (acknowledging that California Pools’s
contention that many courts have held that knowledge of use is enough to defeat a good
faith claim is correct, but the 5th Circuit’s past precedent specifically states that
knowledge is not dispositive and that any good faith examination must consider multiple
relevant factors).
122. See id. at 700.
123. Id. (citing El Chico, Inc. v. El Chico Cafe, 214 F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 1954))
(stating that a junior user’s knowledge is only one factor in a comprehensive good faith
determination).
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However, the Supreme Court emphasizes in Hanover Star Milling Co. that
knowledge, rather than intent, is the only meaningful factor for determining
good faith by repeatedly using the phrases “good faith” and “with no
knowledge or notice” together throughout the opinion.124 The Court first
mentions this connection by saying that the trademark was “adopted and
used in good faith without knowledge or notice that the name ‘Tea Rose’ had
been adopted or used [by another] . . . .”125 The Court then continues to
assert that Hanover Star was not infringing on the mark, stating that it had
“adopted ‘Tea Rose’ as its mark in perfect good faith, with no knowledge
that anybody else was using or had used those words in such a
connection . . . .”126 The Court also points out that a junior user is acting in
bad faith where it “acts fraudulently or with knowledge of [the senior user’s]
rights . . . .”127
This phrasing is also prevalent throughout United Drug Co., clearly
connecting a lack of knowledge with good faith and stating that knowledge
of a senior user’s mark implies bad faith.128 By strictly applying the use of
these terms and the holdings of both United States Supreme Court cases to
C.P. Interests, it is clear that lacking knowledge of a senior user’s mark is
equivalent to operating in good faith.129 This also implies that intent to
benefit is not highly determinative of good faith.130
When reexamining GTE Corp. with this same analysis from Hanover Star
Milling Co. and United Drug Co., it is easy to see that this case should have
come out completely different.131 The facts in GTE Corp. differ from the
facts in Hanover Star Milling Co. and C.P. Interests, Inc. because Williams,
124. See Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. at 410–20 (lacking any mention of intent
to benefit).
125. Id. at 410 (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 412 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 419 (emphasis added).
128. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 96, 103 (1918)
(describing the companies’ uses of the trademarking as occurring “in perfect good faith,
neither side having any knowledge or notice of what was being done by the other.”).
129. See id. at 95, 101, 103–04 (deciding that Rectanus did not have any knowledge
of United Drug Company’s prior use of the “Rex” mark and thus was operating in good
faith); see also Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. at 410, 419 (discussing whether
Hanover Star had knowledge of another’s use of the “Tea Rose” mark and determining
that it did not, so it was operating in good faith and could continue using the mark).
130. See United Drug Co., 248 U.S. at 101; Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. at
412.
131. Compare GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 541 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing
Value House v. Phillips Mercantile Co., 523 F.2d 424, 431 (10th Cir. 1975)) (describing
Williams as good faith user despite him admitting to having knowledge of the senior
user’s mark), with Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. at 409 (noting that Hanover Star
was a good faith user because of the lack of knowledge).
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the junior user, had actual and constructive knowledge that a senior user,
GTE, was using a confusingly similar mark.132 The Tenth Circuit decided
that GTE could not make a valid infringement claim without showing that
Williams using this mark “was likely to cause consumer confusion in the
market.”133 The Circuit also decided that Williams adopted the mark in good
faith regardless of the fact that he had actual knowledge of another user with
an almost identical mark because he “did not select the mark for the purpose
of benefiting from [the senior user’s] reputation and goodwill.”134 However,
applying the analysis from Hanover Star Milling Co. to this case, Williams
should automatically be considered a bad faith user because of his
knowledge that someone else, though he was not sure who, was using the
same mark.135 Similarly, applying the analysis from United Drug Co. to this
case, Williams could not be in perfect good faith because he had “knowledge
or notice of what was being done by the [senior user].”136 Having any
knowledge or notice must automatically make Williams a bad faith user.137
The Fifth and Tenth Circuits, just like those of Circuits A, also discuss the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Hanover Star Milling Co. in deciding what
constitutes good faith.138 Through this analysis, the Circuits determined that
if two users are independently using the same mark in good faith, a court
does not need to determine if one user had knowledge of the other user’s
use.139 Circuits A focused on the strong relationship between good faith and
132. See Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. at 409 (concluding that Hanover did not
have actual or constructive knowledge); C.P. Interests, Inc. v. Cal. Pools, Inc., 238 F.3d
690, 692 (5th Cir. 2001) (highlighting that C.P. Interests only learned of California Pools,
Inc. when California Pools requested that C.P Interests stop using the name); GTE Corp.,
904 F.2d at 541 (admitting that Williams had knowledge of the senior user).
133. See GTE Corp., 904 F.2d at 539 (explaining that even if the court assumed GTE
had obtained a nationally valid registered trademark, GTE could not win any
infringement litigation without proving that Williams’, or any other junior user’s, use of
that mark would cause significant confusion for consumers); see also Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2012) (stating that a junior user is liable in a civil action if its use of a
trademark is “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive”).
134. GTE Corp., 904 F.2d at 541 (quoting Value House, 523 F.2d at 431).
135. Compare Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. at 409–10 (noting that the junior
user in was allowed to operate in good faith because of his lack of knowledge of the
senior user’s use), with GTE Corp., 904 F.2d at 541–42 (finding that the junior user in
was allowed to operate in good faith despite his knowledge of the senior user’s use).
136. United Drug Co., 248 U.S. at 95–96 (explaining that neither United Drug nor
Rectanus could be a bad faith user because both were operating with no knowledge of
the other).
137. See id.
138. Id. at 96–97; C.P. Interests Inc. v. Cal. Pools Inc., 238 F.3d 690, 700 (5th Cir.
2001).
139. See Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. at 415; see also Stone Creek, Inc. v.
Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 875 F.3d 426, 437–38 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing the
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knowledge, while Circuits B relied heavily on a short section in Hanover
Star Milling Co. to resolve this issue.140 Circuits B adopted the Supreme
Court’s explanation that courts do not necessarily need to determine which
user has acquired the trademark in question first because:
[W]here two parties independently are employing the same mark upon
goods of the same class, but in separate markets wholly remote the one
from the other, the question of prior appropriation is legally insignificant;
unless, at least, it appears[s] that the second adopter [or junior user] has
selected the mark with some design inimical to the interests of the [senior]
user, such as to take the benefit of the reputation of his goods, to forestall
the extension of his trade, or the like.141

However, this mention of intent to benefit only occurs one time in
Hanover Star Milling Co., and briefly occurs one more time in United Drug
Co. when citing to Hanover Star Milling Co., but in a slightly different
context.142 In both cases, the Court instead demonstrates a strong
relationship between the concepts of “good faith” and “knowledge.”143 Both
cases repeatedly mention that the junior user had independently employed
the same mark, and therefore must have been operating in good faith.144
perspectives of circuits on the opposite side of the split). See generally C.P. Interests
Inc., 238 F.3d at 700 (explaining the Fifth Circuit’s refusal to conform with the majority
view by holding that knowledge does not always have to be inconsistent with good faith);
GTE Corp., 904 F.2d at 541–42 (holding that knowledge should not divert focus away
from the most important prong of the Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine, the junior user’s intent
to benefit).
140. Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. at 415; see, e.g., Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia
Italian Design, Inc., 875 F.3d 426, 438 (9th Cir. 2017); Nat’l Ass’n for Healthcare
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Cent. Ark. Area Agency on Aging Inc., 257 F.3d 732, 735 (8th Cir.
2001); Money Store v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 674–75 (7th Cir. 1982).
141. Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. at 415 (emphasis added) (citation omitted);
see also United Drug Co., 248 U.S. at 101 (citing Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. at
415) (explaining that Rectanus had no suggestion of sinister purpose when using United
Drug’s mark).
142. United Drug Co., 248 U.S. at 101; Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. at 415
(“The question of prior appropriation is legally insignificant, unless at least it appear that
the second adopter has selected the mark with some design inimical to the interests of
the first user . . . .”); see also Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 438 (“The Court [in United
Drug Co.] repeats the ‘design inimical’ language as a direct quote of the language from
the Tea Rose case and mentions offhand that the junior user did not have a ‘sinister
purpose.’”) (citations omitted).
143. See, e.g., Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. at 410, 419 (stating that the
“trademark was adopted and used in good faith without knowledge or notice that . . . [the
mark] had been adopted or used by another” and that the junior user was operating “in
good faith and without notice of the [senior user’s use of the same] mark”); United Drug
Co., 248 U.S. at 96, 103 (noting the junior user was operating “in perfect good faith,
neither side having any knowledge or notice of what was being done by the other” and
selected the mark “in good faith and without notice of any prior use by others . . . .”).
144. See, e.g., Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. at 415 (“[W]here two parties
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Both opinions also specify that the junior users in each respective case
must have been operating in good faith, as the junior and senior users both
did not have any knowledge or any notice of the other’s use.145 Applying
this strong relationship to the cases in Circuits B clearly illustrates that,
doctrinally speaking, knowledge must preclude good faith.146 The United
States Supreme Court cases concerning the Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine have
all generally emphasized the importance of knowledge in a good faith
determination.147
b. Applying the Lanham Act
The holding of Circuits A can also be used to apply the language in
different sections of the Lanham Act to common law trademarks to discuss
the importance of focusing on a junior user’s knowledge.148 Applying the
same analysis to the cases of Circuits B illustrates the ways in which these
cases should have come out differently. For instance, Section 1115 of the
Lanham Act requires that a junior user’s mark is adopted without knowledge
of prior use, consequently allowing the Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine to be
invoked or rejected based only on knowledge.149 If the Lanham Act
specifically requires that a junior user must use a mark without knowledge
of any other use, it follows that a good faith junior user cannot have any
knowledge.150
independently are employing the same mark upon goods of the same class, but in separate
markets wholly remote the one from the other . . . .”); United Drug Co., 248 U.S. at 101
(citing Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. at 415).
145. See United Drug Co., 248 U.S. at 101; see also Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at
438–39 (citing K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 314 n.8 (1988)) (explaining
that each seminal case linked good faith with knowledge multiple times).
146. Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 438–39 (citing Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S.
at 419; United Drug Co., 248 U.S. at 103; MCCARTHY, supra note 29, § 26:12) (“Tying
good faith to knowledge makes sense in light of the policy underlying the doctrinal
framework. [The doctrine intends to] protect a junior user who unwittingly adopted the
same mark and invested time and resources into building a business with that mark.”).
147. See id.; see also K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 314 (1988) (“[A]
firm [or junior user] can develop a trademark that is identical to a trademark already in
use [by a senior user] in a geographically distinct and remote area if the firm is unaware
of the identity.”).
148. See Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 431, 437 (stating that the Lanham Act applies
to both unregistered and registered trademarks, although the Act never specifically
mentions unregistered trademarks by name); see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,
Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (explaining that the same requirements for registered
trademarks to be considered protectable must also apply to all unregistered common law
trademarks).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5); see Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 439.
150. See Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 439.
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This interpretation is extremely similar to the reasoning employed by the
Supreme Court in Hanover Star Milling Co. and United Drug Co., as
previously discussed.151 For example, in C.P. Interests, the junior user, C.P.
Interests, did not have any knowledge of the senior user’s mark, so it would
still be operating in good faith under the Lanham Act’s analysis.152 In GTE
Corp., however, the junior user, Williams, did have actual knowledge of
GTE’s use of the name “General Telephone and Electronics of
California.”153 Because of this, Williams could not be a good faith user under
the Lanham Act.154
Another relevant section of the Lanham Act, Section 1057[b], specifically
states that if a senior user receives federal registration for a trademark, that
user is afforded nationwide rights regardless of where the user actually used
that mark.155 Later users are assumed to have knowledge of a federally
registered mark that is listed on the federal register, as that clearly proves the
senior user’s claim of ownership.156 This assumption serves as constructive
notice, and some courts may consider this notice enough to defeat a good
faith claim.157 According to this section of the Lanham Act, the Swiss cheese
metaphor from Stone Creek, Inc. can only apply to unregistered marks used
in good faith in distinct areas prior to federal registration.158
Some may consider this section of the Lanham Act as negating the purpose
of the Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine by both reducing the types of cases it can
apply to and prohibiting two users both operating in good faith from
maintaining their common law rights.159 But since the Lanham Act also
151. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 101 (1918);
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415 (1916).
152. See C.P. Interests Inc. v. Cal. Pools Inc., 238 F.3d 690, 692, 700 (5th Cir. 2001).
153. See GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 541 (10th Cir. 1990).
154. See id. at 541–42; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5).
155. See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (“A certificate of registration of a mark . . . shall be
prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the
mark, of the owner’s ownership of the mark, and of the owner’s exclusive right to use
the registered mark . . . .”); see also Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 439.
156. See Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 436, 439 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1072) (stating
that registering a mark on the principal register is considered constructive notice of
ownership); see also Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b); MCCARTHY, supra note 29,
§ 26:32.
157. See Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 439 (explaining that the Lanham Act could
potentially displace the defense of the Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine “by charging later
users with knowledge of a mark listed on the federal register”).
158. Id. at 436 (citing MCCARTHY, supra note 29, § 26:31) (“[T]he geographic scope
of the senior user’s rights in a registered trademark looks like Swiss cheese: it stretches
throughout the United States with holes cut out where others acquired common-law
rights prior to the registration.”).
159. See id. at 439.
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allows for concurrent use registration, some may instead consider that it
supplements the doctrine by allowing two different parties who are using a
mark in good faith before either party files for federal trademark registration
to both continue using the mark.160
In Stone Creek, Inc., however, the court interpreted these sections of the
Lanham Act slightly differently, specifying that if federal registration and
the subsequent constructive notice occur after the good faith junior user has
already been using the mark for some time, holes must be cut out of the
senior owner’s rights, which are stretching around the country.161 The court
also stated that a junior user with constructive notice can still seek to use the
Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine as a defense in a trademark infringement case,
but the other elements of the doctrine will then weigh more heavily to
determine whether the junior user will be successful.162
If constructive notice is considered satisfactory to defeat good faith, it is
clear that actual notice must also be enough.163 With this reasoning, neither
of the junior users in C.P. Interests nor in GTE Corp. would be considered
good faith junior users. C.P. Interests began using the trademark in 1961,
but when California Pools filed for federal trademark registration in 1995,
C.P. Interests had constructive notice of a different senior user and could not
be a good faith user.164 Similarly, Williams in GTE Corp. began using
“General Telephone” trademark in 1974, but when GTE registered the same
mark in 1982, Williams also had constructive notice of a senior user and
could no longer be a good faith user.165
c. Extent of Knowledge
The Tenth Circuit implied that a good faith determination must also
consider the extent of knowledge that a junior user has about a senior user’s
160. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (“[I]f the [court] determines that confusion, mistake, or
deception is not likely to result from the continued use by more than one person of the
same or similar marks . . . concurrent registrations may be issued to such persons when
they have become entitled to use such marks . . . .”).
161. See Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 436 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5); Johnny
Blastoff, Inc. v. LA Rams Football Co., 188 F.3d 427, 435 (7th Cir. 1999)) (“[T]he
Lanham Act can preserve legal and equitable defenses that could have been asserted prior
to registration. Under this rule, already-established common-law rights are carved out
of the registrant’s [usually nationwide] scope of protection.”).
162. See id. (reasoning that because Omnia began using Stone Creek’s trademark in
2008, four years before Stone Creek received federal registration of that mark in 2012,
Omnia would be able to use a Tea Rose-Rectanus defense if the other prongs applied,
even though this court determined that Omnia was not acting in good faith at any time).
163. Id. at 439.
164. See C.P. Interests, Inc. v. Cal. Pools, Inc., 238 F.3d 690, 692, 700 (5th Cir. 2001).
165. See GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 537, 541 (10th Cir. 1990).
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mark.166 The Circuit stated that Williams did not have enough knowledge
that GTE or any other entity used the name “General Telephone” as a
trademark, indicating that this was not enough to preclude good faith.167 The
Circuit decided this despite the fact that Williams admitted to having once
heard of a company called “General Telephone and Electronics of
California.”168 It is not clear if Williams was aware of what market or
territory GTE operated in, so it is possible that he believed he was still a good
faith user.169 The Circuit held that this was enough for him to be a good faith
user, but this does not conform with the precedent set by the Hanover Star
Milling Co. and United Drug Co. cases.170
The United States Supreme Court briefly discusses extent of knowledge
in United Drug Co. by comparing the facts to four previous Supreme Court
cases about conscious trademark infringement.171 In each of these cases, the
defendants admitted to having knowledge of the existence of a senior user’s
confusingly similar mark, but for different, unrelated reasons, the junior
users were still allowed to continue using their mark.172 The Court does not
delve any further into this issue other than to say that proof of infringement
must be very clear for a court to grant relief.173 The Court also states that the
facts in these cases are not similar enough to apply to Hanover Star Milling
Co., leaving the door open for this argument.174
166. Id. at 541.
167. Id. (“Williams had no knowledge that GTE used or claimed to use “General

Telephone” as a trade or service mark, or that any other entity used or claimed to use that
mark . . . .”) (citation omitted).
168. Id. (finding that Williams had heard of a company named “General Telephone
and Electronics of California” in the context of litigation in California when he adopted
the General Telephone mark in 1974) (citation omitted).
169. Id.
170. Compare GTE Corp., 904 F.2d at 541 (acknowledging that it is “only in unusual
cases” that a junior user with knowledge can act in good faith, but still distinguishing
between Williams’ admitted knowledge of “General Telephone & Electrics of
California” and his lack of knowledge of use of the mark “General Telephone”), with
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412, 419 (1916) (explaining that the
junior user was acting in good faith because it did not have any knowledge at all of the
senior user), and United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 101–04 (1918)
(stating that both the senior and junior user acted “in perfect good faith, neither side
having any knowledge or notice of what was being done by the other”).
171. United Drug Co., 248 U.S. at 102–03 (citing McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245
(1877); Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514 (1888); Saxlehner v. Eisner & Mendelson Co.,
179 U.S. 19 (1900); Saxlehner v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 179 U.S. 42 (1900)).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 102 (analyzing these cases as proving the rule that a court ordinarily will
not refuse an injunction for future protection if infringement is clear).
174. See id. at 103 (explaining that the facts of the four cited cases — McLean,
Menendez, Eisner, and Siegel-Cooper Co. — were not similar enough to the facts of
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The Tenth Circuit utilized this reasoning in GTE Corp., where GTE argued
that any level of knowledge should, by itself, defeat a good faith claim.175
However, the Circuit still held that knowledge should not take away from
the ultimate focus on intent to benefit, despite the fact that a junior user’s
adoption of a trademark with knowledge does, in fact, strongly support a
finding of bad faith.176 The Circuit stated that only some unusual cases have
findings of a junior user adopting a mark both in good faith and with
knowledge; however, this reasoning does not seem to conform with previous
United States Supreme Court precedent.177 In this case, the Circuit
disregarded this precedent and still held that even though Williams had
briefly heard of GTE, he never intended to benefit from GTE’s reputation or
goodwill.178
IV. RESOLVING THE SPLIT: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USING KNOWLEDGE
IN GOOD FAITH DETERMINATIONS
Both sides of the circuit split concerning the Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine
acknowledge the importance of an objective good faith determination to
award exclusive rights to a trademark.179 However, the seminal cases of the
United Drug Co. to adequately compare them).
175. GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 541 (10th Cir. 1990) (“GTE argues that
the level of knowledge found by the district court, by itself, should defeat a finding of
good faith.”).
176. See id. (citing Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1485
(10th Cir. 1987); Beer Nuts Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 927 (10th Cir.
1986) (supporting the premise that a user’s adoption of a mark with knowledge of
another’s use can support an inference of bad faith but should not necessarily foreclose
further inquiry); General Mills, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 824 F.2d 622, 627 (8th Cir. 1987)
(“Knowledge of another’s product and an intent to compete with that product is not,
however, equivalent to an intent by a new entrant to a market to mislead and to cause
consumer confusion.”).
177. See, e.g., K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 314 n.8 (1988) (ruling that
a junior user can only develop a trademark that is accidentally identical or accidentally
similar to a senior user’s already existing mark if the junior user is unaware of that
existing mark). But see LALONDE & GILSON, supra note 1, § 3.02(10)(a)(ii) (explaining
that if a mark is well known to consumers in a specific territory, it is highly unlikely that
a junior user can be operating in good faith without knowledge of prior use).
178. See GTE Corp., 904 F.2d at 541 (emphasizing that the junior user is presumed
to have actual knowledge of the mark in its territory and that should force the junior user
to automatically lose its credibility to establish a good faith defense, but holding that
without intent to benefit, good faith may still stand).
179. See, e.g., Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 875 F.3d 426, 439 (9th
Cir. 2017) (holding the Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine is not applicable where a defendant
was not an innocent user acting in good faith); C.P. Interests, Inc. v. Cal. Pools, Inc., 238
F.3d 690, 700 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing
an objective good faith instruction, as objective knowledge of use is a factor used by the
Fifth Circuit in a good faith inquiry).
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doctrine, which both clearly discuss knowledge as the only determining
factor for good faith, cannot be ignored.180 In Hanover Star Milling Co., the
United States Supreme Court specifically states that the junior user had
adopted and used the disputed mark in good faith, “without knowledge or
notice” that the name was used by any other party.181 In United Drug Co.,
the Court awards trademark rights to the “innocent” junior user because both
parties acted in “perfect good faith, with neither side having any knowledge
or notice of what was being done by the other.”182
Circuits A, or the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, hold that if a junior
user has knowledge that a senior user is using the same trademark, that
knowledge automatically precludes good faith, and the junior user cannot
have any ownership rights to the mark.183 These Circuits, relying on the
seminal cases of the Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine, have decided knowledge
is the only determinative factor for a good faith junior user.184 Because these
Circuits rely heavily on both United States Supreme Court precedent and
statutory interpretation of the Lanham Act, this perspective of the Tea RoseRectanus doctrine is the most beneficial in protecting the rights of all
trademark owners and users.185
The opposing Circuits, or the Fifth and Tenth Circuits, hold that
knowledge is only one element in what should be a multi-factored test to
determine good faith.186 This broader test is meant to focus on the intent to
benefit from the reputation or goodwill of the senior user, while reducing the
importance of knowledge.187 This test is also meant to protect innocent
junior users who might have little knowledge but no intent, such as Williams

180. See, e.g., United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 103 (1918)
(holding junior user could continue to use mark because it acted in good faith and
established a local and valuable trade using the mark); Hanover Star Milling Co. v.
Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 419 (1916) (reasoning where a party used a mark in good faith
without knowledge of the other’s use and built up a trade in its market, both could
maintain use as the party was an innocent user).
181. Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. at 410.
182. United Drug Co., 248 U.S. at 95–96, 103.
183. See, e.g., Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 438; Nat’l Ass’n for Healthcare
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Cent. Ark. Area Agency on Aging Inc., 257 F.3d 732, 735 (8th Cir.
2001); Money Store v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 674–75 (7th Cir. 1982).
184. See, e.g., Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 438; Nat’l Ass’n for Healthcare
Commc’ns, Inc., 257 F.3d at 735; Money Store, 689 F.2d at 674–75.
185. See, e.g., Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 438; Nat’l Ass’n for Healthcare
Commc’ns, Inc., 257 F.3d at 735; Money Store, 689 F.2d at 674–75.
186. See, e.g., C.P. Interests, Inc. v. Cal. Pools, Inc., 238 F.3d 690, 700 (5th Cir. 2001);
GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 541 (10th Cir. 1990).
187. See, e.g., C.P. Interests, Inc., 238 F.3d at 700; GTE Corp., 904 F.2d at 541.
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in GTE Corp.188 However, this test can also easily allow bad faith users with
knowledge and malicious intent to continue unfairly benefitting at the
expense of senior users, such as Omnia in Stone Creek, Inc.189
Because of this circuit split, courts can hold trademark users to different
standards depending on where in the country the user operates.190 Cases with
extremely similar facts are decided differently in Circuits A and Circuits B,
while cases in the remaining circuits that have not decided how to determine
good faith have no precedent. This split must be resolved in favor of the
majority and allow knowledge to be the only determinative factor for a good
faith junior user.
V. CONCLUSION
The Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine is a trademark rule that has created an
exception to the general trademark rule granting a senior user of a trademark
superior rights over any subsequent users of that mark. This exception
allows junior users to continue using a mark that a senior user is also using
as long as the junior user is operating in good faith. The Seventh, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits have split from the Fifth and Tenth Circuits by
determining that knowledge of a senior user’s use always destroys good
faith. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have followed a broader good faith test
by regarding knowledge as one factor in a larger good faith test. This split
must be resolved in favor of the majority to protect both trademark owners
and good faith users.

188. See GTE Corp., 904 F.2d at 539. But see LALONDE & GILSON supra note 1,
§ 3.02[3][c][v] (explaining that a well-known mark in a specific territory has to be wellknown by most in that territory, so it is highly unlikely that a junior user could not know
that it would benefit from the reputation of that well-known mark; this is what causes the
junior user to lose its credibility and lose its ability to establish a good faith defense).
189. Stone Creek, Inc., 875 F.3d at 437.
190. Id. (explaining the existing split between circuits in different areas of the
country).

